Introduction
Markov chains 1 and Markov decision processes (MDPs) are special cases of stochastic games. Markov chains describe the dynamics of the states of a stochastic game where each player has a single action in each state. Similarly, the dynamics of the states of a stochastic game form a Markov chain whenever the players' strategies are stationary. Markov decision processes are stochastic games with a single player. In addition, the decision problem faced by a player in a stochastic game when all other players choose a fixed profile of stationary strategies is equivalent to an MDP.
The present chapter states classical results on Markov chains and Markov decision processes. The proofs use methods that introduce the reader to proofs of more general analog results on stochastic games.
Finite State Markov Chains
A transition matrix is an n × n matrix P such that all entries P i,j of P are nonnegative and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have n j=1 P i,j = 1. A finite state stationary Markov chain, or Markov chain for short, is a discrete stochastic process z 1 , . . . , z t , . . . with values z t in the finite set S = {1, . . . , n} and such that Pr(z t+1 = j | z 1 , . . . , z t = i) = P i,j , where P is an n × n transition matrix.
An n × n transition matrix P together with an (initial) distribution µ on S = {1, . . . , n} defines a discrete stochastic process (z 1 , . . . , z t , . . .) with values z t in S by the following formulas.
Pr(z 1 = j) = µ (j) and Pr(z t+1 = j | z 1 , . . . , z t = i) = P i,j .
The interpretation is that the initial state z 1 ∈ S is chosen according to the initial distribution µ and thereafter the state in stage t + 1 depends stochastically on z t . The probability of moving from state i to state j equals P i,j .
It follows by induction on t that the probability of moving in t ≥ 0 stages from state i to state j, i.e., Pr(z s+t = j | z 1 , . . . , z s = i), equals (P t ) i,j . Indeed, it holds trivially for t = 0, 1. By the induction hypothesis it follows that for t > 0 we have Pr 
We proceed with a well-known and classical result. Proposition 1 Let P be an n × n transition matrix. converges as k → ∞ to a transition matrix Q, and, moreover, the sequence I + P + . . .
(c) For every n × 1 column vector c, the system of equations
has a unique solution. (d) I-(P-Q) is nonsingular, and
H(β) = t≥0 β t (P t − Q) → β→1− H = (I − P − Q) −1 − Q. H(β)Q = QH(β) = HQ = QH = 0 and (I − P )H = H(I − P ) = I − Q.
Markov Decision Processes
A special subclass of stochastic games is the class of Markov decision processes, i.e., stochastic games with a single player. This section reexamines classical results on Markov decision processes. A finite-state-and-action MDP consists of − a finite set S, the set of states; − for every z ∈ S a finite action set A(z); − for every pair consisting of a state z in S and an action a ∈ A(z) a reward r(z, a); − for every pair consisting of a state z in S and an action a ∈ A(z) a probability distribution p (z, a) on S; − an initial distribution µ on S.
The interpretation is as follows. The set A(z) is the set of feasible actions at state z. The initial distribution of the state z 1 is according to µ. If at stage t the state is z t and action a t ∈ A(z t ) is played, the decision-maker gets a stage payoff of r(z t , a t ) at stage t and the conditional distribution of the next state z t+1 given all past states and actions z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z t , a t is given by p (z t , a t ). We use the common notational convention denoting the probability of z t+1 = z given z t = z and
The quadruple S, A, r, p is called an MDP form.
STRATEGIES
A pure strategy 2 of the decision-maker in an MDP is a function σ that assigns to every finite string h = (
The set of all pure strategies is denoted Σ. A behavioral strategy is a function σ that assigns to every finite string h = (z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z t ) a probability distribution σ(h) on A(z t ); σ(h) [a] stands for the probability that the behavioral strategy σ chooses the action a (in A(z t )) given the finite history h = (z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z t ). Obviously, when a pure strategy σ is seen as a map that assigns to the finite history h the Dirac measure concentrated on σ(h), it is also a behavioral strategy. Note that the definition of a strategy in an MDP depends only on the state space S and the feasible action sets A(z), z ∈ S. Let H stand for the set of all finite histories (z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z t ), where t is a positive integer and for every s < t the action a s is in A(z s ). Given h = (z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z t ) ∈ H we denote by A(h) the set A(z t ) of feasible actions at state z t . A pure strategy σ is thus a point in the Cartesian product h∈H A(h). This is a Cartesian product of countably many finite sets. Therefore, it is a metrizable compact space. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution on the space of pure strategies, i.e., an element of ∆(Σ) where ∆(B) stands for all probability distributions on B.
Let A probability measure P on the measurable space (H ∞ , H ∞ ) induces a sequence of probability measures P t on (H ∞ , H t ) by defining P t to be the restriction of P to the algebra H t . Note that the restriction of P t to H s where s ≤ t is equal to P s . Also, if P t is a sequence of probability measures on (H ∞ , H t ) such that the restriction of P t to the algebra of subsets H s is equal to P s , then there is a unique measure P on (H ∞ , H ∞ ) whose restriction to (H ∞ , H t ) coincides with P t . Therefore, a common way to define a probability on the space of infinite plays (H ∞ , H ∞ ) is to define recursively a sequence of probability distributions P t on (H ∞ , H t ) such that the restriction of P t to (H ∞ , H s ) (where s ≤ t) equals P s . This last compatibility condition is achieved by defining the conditional probability of P t+1 given H t and thus implicitly stipulating that the restriction of P t+1 to H t coincides with P t .
A pure or behavioral strategy σ together with the initial distribution µ induces a probability distribution P µ σ , or P σ for short, on the space H ∞ as follows.
Note that the right-hand side of the first and last equalities above is independent of σ. A mixed strategy ν ∈ ∆(Σ) is a mixture of pure strategies and therefore the probability P ν that it induces on H ∞ is given by the following formula. Let X be a measurable subset of H ∞ . Then
In particular,
In order to complete the definition of P ν by means of conditional probabilities we have to derive the formula for
For every finite history h = (z 1 , a 1 , . . . , z t ), we denote by Σ(h) the set of all pure strategies compatible with h, i.e., σ ∈ Σ(h) if and only if for every
Given a mixed strategy ν ∈ ∆(Σ), we define the following behavioral strategy τ . Let
The formulas defining P ν and P τ by means of the conditional distributions are identical. Therefore, the probabilities induced on H ∞ by ν and by τ coincide. In addition, if τ is a behavioral strategy we can identify it with a point in the product h∈H ∆(A(h)) and thus with a probability distribution ν on Σ = h∈H A(h). The probability induced on H ∞ by the mixed strategy ν and the behavioral strategy τ coincide. Therefore, any distribution on H ∞ induced by a mixed strategy can be induced by a behavioral strategy and vice versa.
In particular, maximizing (respectively, taking the supremum of) the expectation of a bounded real-valued function defined on H ∞ by means of behavioral strategies or by means of mixed strategies (and therefore also by means of pure strategies) leads to the same maximal (respectively, supremum) value.
A special class of strategies is the class of stationary strategies. A behavioral strategy σ is stationary if σ(z 1 , . . . , z t ) depends only on the state z t . Thus, a stationary strategy is represented by a function σ : S → ∪ z ∆(A(z)) such that σ(z) ∈ ∆(A(z)). Equivalently, a stationary strategy can be represented by a point σ ∈ z∈S ∆(A(z)).
PAYOFFS
The objective of the decision-maker in an MDP is to maximize a specific evaluation of the stream r(z 1 , a 1 ), . . . , r(z t , a t ), . . . of payoffs. In the present chapter we confine ourselves to two evaluations: the discounted evaluation and the limiting average evaluation.
In the β-discounted model, Γ β , the payoff associated with the strategy σ and the initial state z is
where E z σ stands for the expectation with respect to the distribution induced by the initial state z and the strategy σ. The equality follows from the uniform convergence of
For a pair consisting of an initial state z and a discount factor β < 1 we set
The existence of the max follows from the fact that the space of pure strategies is a compact space and the function σ → v(z, β, σ) is continuous in σ. Indeed, for any two pure strategies σ and τ that coincide on all finite histories of length ≤ t we have |v(z,
The existence of the max will follow also from the result in Section 3.3.
Note that for every state z, strategy σ, and 1 > β > γ > 0 we have
In the limiting average model, Γ ∞ , we wish to define the payoff associated with an initial state z and a strategy σ as the expectation of the limit of the average stage payoffs, 1 T T t=1 r(z t , a t ). However, the limit need not exist. Therefore, optimality of a strategy in the limiting average model needs careful definition.
For a pair consisting of a state z and a strategy σ we set It will later be shown that in an MDP with finitely many states and actions there exists a pure stationary strategy σ which satisfies the following optimality conditions. There exists a constant C such that for every initial state z and every strategy τ we have v(z, σ) ≥ u(z, τ ) ≥ v(z, τ ), and, moreover,
THE DISCOUNTED MDP
In this section we prove the classical result that the MDP with finitely many states and actions and a fixed discount factor β has a pure stationary strategy that is optimal for every initial state. Consider the map Ψ from R S to itself defined by
Two immediate properties of this map follow. Monotonicity,
where for x, y ∈ R S we use the notation x ≥ y whenever x(z) ≥ y(z) for every coordinate z, and
where 1 stands for the vector with each of its coordinates equal to 1.
The two inequalities imply that
Therefore, the map Ψ is a (uniformly) strict contraction of the (complete metric) space R S and thus has a unique fixed point w. The (unique) fixed point w satisfies the following equalities.
Therefore, there is a pure stationary strategy σ, i.e., a function σ :
It follows from equation (2) that
and therefore by taking expectation of the conditional expectations in equation (3) and rearranging the terms we have
Multiplying equation (4) by β t−1 and summing over 1 ≤ t < k we deduce that
and therefore
Similarly, using equation (1) we have for every strategy τ that
and therefore by taking expectation of the conditional expectations in equation (5) and rearranging the terms we have
Multiplying equation (6) by β t−1 and summing over t ≥ 1 we deduce that
We conclude that for every strategy τ and every initial state z we have 
(z, β, σ) ≥ v(z, β, τ ).
Moreover, the stationary strategy σ obeys, for every state z,
σ(z))v(z , β) .
The next result provides a formula for the payoff of a Markov stationary strategy (this result obviously applies to every stochastic game). For every (pure or) behavioral stationary strategy σ let P denote the S × S matrix where
Lemma 1 a) The S × S matrix I − βP is invertible and its inverse is given by
(I − βP ) −1 = ∞ t=0 (βP ) t .
b) The payoff as a function of the initial state z, v(z, β, σ), is given by
Proof. The series of finite sums n t=0 β t P t converges, as n → ∞, to the infinite sum ∞ t=0 β t P t . The product (I − βP ) n t=0 β t P t equals I − β n+1 P n+1 , which converges, as n → ∞, to the identity matrix I, and therefore ∞ t=0 β t P t is the inverse of the matrix I − βP , which proves (a).
Notice that E z σ (β t−1 r(z t , a t )) = z ∈S (β t−1 P t−1 ) z,z r σ (z ) and therefore v(z, β, σ) = ∞ t=1 z ∈S (β t−1 tP t−1 ) z,z r σ (z ), which proves (b). A corollary of the lemma is that, for every stationary strategy σ and every state z, the payoff v(z, β, σ) of an MDP with finitely many states and actions is a rational function of the discount factor β, the stage payoffs r(z, a), z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z), and the transition probabilities p (z | z, a) , z, z ∈ S and a ∈ A(z). In what follows, the symbol ∀τ (respectively, ∀z) means for every strategy τ (respectively, for every state z).
Proposition 3 For every MDP form S, A, r, p , there is a pure stationary strategy (policy) σ and a discount factor
0 < β 0 < 1 such that 1) (Blackwell [3]) v(z, β, σ) ≥ v(z, β, τ ) ∀β 0 ≤ β < 1 ∀z ∀τ.
2) (Blackwell [3]) For every state z, the function β → v(z, β) is a rational function on the interval [β 0 , 1). In particular, the limit of v(z, β) as β → 1− exists. Set v(z) := lim β↓1 v(z, β).
3) There is a positive constant C such that for every initial state z 1 , every strategy τ , and every k > 1 we have
4) For every initial state z 1 and every strategy τ we have
Proof. For every stationary strategy σ and every initial state z the function β → v(z, β, σ) is a rational function of β. For every two rational functions f and g defined on a left neighborhood of 1 there is γ < 1 such that either f (β) > g(β) for all γ ≤ β < 1, or f (β) < g(β) for all γ ≤ β < 1, or f (β) = g(β) for all γ ≤ β < 1. By Proposition 2, for every discount factor β there is a pure stationary strategy σ such that for every initial state z and every pure (stationary) strategy τ we have v(z, β, σ) ≥ v(z, β, τ ). There are finitely many pure stationary strategies. Therefore, there is one pure stationary strategy σ which is optimal in the β i discounted MDP, Γ β i , for a sequence of discount factors β i < 1 that converges to 1. Therefore, there is a discount factor β 0 < 1 such that for every pure stationary strategy τ we have
This completes the proof of 1).
In particular, for β 0 ≤ β < 1, v(z, β) = v(z, β, σ), and using Part 2) of Lemma 1 the function β → v(z, β) is a rational function on [β 0 , 1). As β → v(z, β) is a bounded rational function in a left neighborhood of 1, its limit as β ↓ 1 exists. This completes the proof of 2).
We prove 3) by induction on k. The function β → v(z, β) is a bounded rational function. Therefore, it is differentiable in a left neighborhood of 1 and its derivative there is bounded in absolute value, say by C 1 (z) ≤ C 1 . Therefore, there is k 0 such that for every 1 − 1/k 0 ≤ β < γ < 1 and every state z we have |v(z,
is Lipschitz in the interval [0, 1 − 1/k 0 ) there is a positive constant C 2 such that for every 0 ≤ β < γ ≤ 1 − 1/k 0 and every state z we have
W.l.o.g. we assume that C ≥ 2 r . Define the function α by α(k) = C k n≤k n −2 . Observe that for every k we have
We prove by induction on k that for every k ≥ 1 we have
As α(1) = C ≥ 2 r ≥ r + v(·, ·), inequality (9) holds for k = 1. We will show that if inequality (9) holds for some fixed k ≥ 1 then it also holds for k + 1. As (9) holds for k, we have (using the equality
Recall that
Inequality (7) implies that
Summing inequalities (8), (10), (11) and (12) we deduce that
which proves that (9) holds for k + 1, and thus (9) holds for every k ≥ 1.
, the first part of 3) follows. Let (7*) (respectively, (9*), (10*), (11*) and (12*)) stand for (7) (respectively, (9), (10), (11) and (12)) where v is replaced by w := −v, τ is replaced by σ and r is replaced by g := −r. Then (7*), (11*) and (12*) hold for every k. Inequality (9*) holds for k = 1. Therefore, if (9*) holds for some k ≥ 1, then (10*) holds for k, and summing inequalities (8), (10*), (11*) and (12*) we deduce that
which proves that (9*) holds for k + 1, and thus (9*) holds for every k ≥ 1.
, the second part of 3) follows. This completes the proof of 3). Fix β 0 < 1 sufficiently large such that for all
Equation (13) implies that
and equation (14) implies that for every strategy τ we have
Equation (16) implies (by going to the limit as β → 1−) that for every strategy τ we have
Therefore, the stochastic process (v(z t )) is a bounded supermartingale (respectively, a martingale) w.r.t. the probability induced by τ (respectively, by σ) and thus has a limit v τ (respectively, v σ ) almost everywhere w.r.t. the probability induced by τ (respectively, by σ), and
Let ε > 0. By Part 3) of Proposition 3 there is k sufficiently large so that for every m we have
For every integer n ≥ 1 we set
, and u n := v(z (n−1)k+1 ). Equation (18) implies that for every positive integer n we have
The stochastic process (Y n ) is a bounded sequence of martingale differences and therefore
As (u n ) n = (v(z (n−1)k+1 )) n is a subsequence of the sequence (v(z t )) t that converges a.e. w.r.t. τ to v τ , and
We conclude that
As the last inequality holds for every ε > 0 we conclude that
Similarly, setting Y σ n := Z n − E σ (Z n | H k(n−1)+1 ) we deduce that the stochastic process (u n ) is a martingale w.r.t. the probability induced by σ and thus converges a.e. to a limit v σ with E σ (v σ ) = v(z 1 ). By Part 3) it follows that for a sufficiently large k we have
Remarks
In this section we discuss the extension of the above-mentioned results on MDPs to results on two-person zero-sum stochastic games with finitely many states and actions. Remark 1 The definition of a finite-state-and-action stochastic game is a minor modification to the definition of an MDP. The set of players is a finite set I. The set A(z) is the Cartesian product of finite sets A i (z), i ∈ I; A i (z) is the set of feasible actions of player i ∈ I at state z. The reward r(z, a) is the vector of rewards r i (z, a) i∈I ; player i gets a stage payoff r i (z t , a t ) at stage t. A vector of strategies σ = (σ i ) i∈I together with the initial distribution µ induces a probability distribution P µ σ on the space of infinite plays, exactly as in the setup of an MDP (with σ(z 1 , . .
Remark 2 In a two-person zero-sum stochastic game we define the value of the β-discounted stochastic game by
The map from R S to itself, v → Ψv, defined by
where the max is over all x ∈ ∆(A 1 (z)), the min is over all y ∈ ∆(A 2 (z)), and r 1 (z, x, y) (respectively p (z | z, x, y)) is the multilinear extension of
, is a strict contraction [14] , [17] . Its unique fixed point, w(·, β) (whose z-th coordinate is w(z, β)) is the value of the β-discounted stochastic game [14] , [17] .
Remark 3
In an MDP with finitely many states and actions there exist for every discount factor β < 1 a pure strategy that is optimal in the β-discounted MDP (Proposition 2), and a uniform optimal strategy, namely a strategy that is optimal in all β-discounted MDPs with the discount factor β sufficiently close to 1 (Proposition 3, Part 1)). These two results do not extend to results on two-person zero-sum stochastic games with finitely many states and actions. However, there are special classes of stochastic games where a pure optimal strategy and a uniform optimal strategy do exist (see, e.g., [13] , [19] , [20] and the references there).
Remark 4
Part 2) of Proposition 3 states that, for a fixed MDP with finitely many states and actions, the function β → v(z, β) is a bounded rational function of β and thus, in particular, it can be expressed, in a sufficiently small left neighborhood of 1 (β 0 < β < 1), as a convergent series in powers of 1 − β. In a two-person zero-sum stochastic game with finitely many states and actions such an expression is no longer available. However, Bewley and Kohlberg [1] show that the value of the β-discounted stochastic game is expressed in a left neighborhood of 1 as a convergent series in fractional powers of (1 − β) (see also [9] ).
Remark 5 Part 3) of Proposition 3 provides an approximation to the n- In particular, it proves that the limit of v(z, n) as n → ∞ exists and equals lim β→1− v(z, β) [1] (see also [11] ).
However, other series in fractional powers of 1/n provide a better approximation of v(z, n). There exists a series in fractional powers of 1/n, . It is impossible to improve on the error term [2] .
Remark 6 It will be shown in a later chapter, [10] , that the existence of a uniform optimal strategy σ in an MDP, Proposition 3, has the following counterpart of ε uniform optimality in two-person zero-sum stochastic games.
For every ε > 0 there are strategies σ ε of player 1 and τ ε of player 2, and a positive integer N and a discount factor β 0 < 1, such that for every strategy τ of player 2 and every strategy σ of player 1 we have 
Remark 7
In this chapter we considered transition matrices with values in the field of real numbers. However, one could consider Markov chains with a transition matrix whose values are in any ordered field. A field that has proved especially useful in the study of stochastic games is the field of functions that have an expansion in a left neighborhood of 1 as a power series in a fraction of 1−β (here β does not necessarily refer to the discount factor, but may be simply a parameter). This construction allows one to study the sensitivity of various statistics of the Markov chain as one varies the parameter β in a left neighborhood of 1. For more details, see [15] , [18] , [16] .
